Fix heap overflows in CDG decoder
authorDan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Fri, 7 Jan 2011 16:06:08 +0000 (11:06 -0500)
committerRémi Denis-Courmont <remi@remlab.net>
Tue, 11 Jan 2011 18:17:02 +0000 (20:17 +0200)
This patch resolves two heap corruption vulnerabilities in the CDG
decoder for VLC media player.  In both cases, a failure to properly
validate indexes into statically-sized arrays on the heap could allow a
maliciously crafted CDG video to corrupt the heap in a controlled
manner, potentially leading to code execution.

The patch is against v1.1.5 from vlc git, but this decoder hasn't been
touched in awhile, so I'd expect it to cleanly apply to older versions.
I've tested it and confirmed it resolves the heap corruption issues and
does not break functionality.

(...)

Signed-off-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi@remlab.net>
modules/codec/cdg.c

index 31ecd0e..fe7b62d 100644 (file)
@@ -254,7 +254,13 @@ static int DecodeTileBlock( decoder_sys_t *p_cdg, const uint8_t *p_data, int doX
         for( x = 0; x < 6; x++ )
         {
             const int idx = ( p_data[4+y] >> (5-x) ) & 0x01;
-            uint8_t *p = &p_cdg->p_screen[(sy+y)*CDG_SCREEN_PITCH+(sx+x)];
+
+            int index = (sy+y)*CDG_SCREEN_PITCH+(sx+x);
+            if( index >= CDG_SCREEN_PITCH*CDG_SCREEN_HEIGHT )
+                return 0;
+
+            uint8_t *p = &p_cdg->p_screen[index];
+
             if( doXor )
                 *p ^= p_color[idx];
             else
@@ -319,8 +325,8 @@ static int DecodeScroll( decoder_sys_t *p_cdg, const uint8_t *p_data, int b_copy
 
             if( b_copy )
             {
-                dy = ( dy + CDG_SCREEN_HEIGHT ) % CDG_SCREEN_HEIGHT;
-                dy = ( dy + CDG_SCREEN_WIDTH  ) % CDG_SCREEN_WIDTH;
+                dy %= CDG_SCREEN_HEIGHT;
+                dx %= CDG_SCREEN_WIDTH;
             }
             else
             {